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We can improve our teaching of statistical examples from books by collecting further
data, reading cited articles, and performing further data analysis. This should not come
as a surprise, but what might be new is the realization of how close to the surface these
research opportunities are: even influential and celebrated books can have examples
where more can be learned with a small amount of additional effort.
We discuss three examples that have arisen in our own teaching: an introductory
textbook that motivated us to think more carefully about categorical and continuous
variables; a book for the lay reader that misreported a study of menstruation and
accidents; and a monograph on the foundations of probability that overinterpreted
statistically insignificant fluctuations in sex ratios.
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Introduction
This article considers three examples from our own teaching experiences in which much
was learned by going to the sources of examples in books. It was surprisingly easy to
discover areas where even excellent and well-regarded books had opportunities for debate,
and we hope that this article will motivate other instructors to more critically examine the
monographs, texts, and general-interest books that they use for teaching. We suspect this
will help students in learning general research skills as well as statistical methods.
Categorical or continuous?
The book Mind on Statistics, by Jessica Utts and Robert Heckard (2001), is an excellent
text that is full of examples for statistics classes at all levels. A fun thing about working
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Dominant hand Left-handed, right-handed
Regular church attendance Yes, no
Opinion about marijuana legislation Yes, no, not sure
Eye color Brown, blue, green, hazel
Figure 1: Variables listed as “categorical” in Utts and Heckard (2001). I don’t know
enough about eye color to comment, but the first three variables could also be considered
as fundamentally continuous; see Figure 2a for the handedness example. Discussing this in
class can give students a deeper understanding of discrete and numerical data.
from a good textbook is that more can be learned by considering its examples in further
depth. For example, Figure 1 shows a table from early on in the book, where the concepts
of numerical and categorical variables are introduced. From another perspective, though,
three out of the four variables that they list as categorical could be also be considered as
continuous.
The issue is clearest with handedness, which Utts and Heckard categorize as left or right-
handed but can be also described by a continuous variable, as we illustrate with the first
histogram in Figure 2, which is based on data we collected from students in a class. (More
systematic surveys obtain similar results; see, for example, Oldfield, 1971.) As Figure 2a
shows, many people fall between the two extremes of pure left- and pure right-handedness.
But, as Figure 2b illustrates, students tend to guess the distribution of handedness to be
bimodal and thus essentially discrete. This common misconception would make handedness
a particularly effective example of a continuous variable that is often summarized discretely.
Similar issues arise for other variables listed in Figure 1. Church attendance can be
measured by a numerical frequency (for example, number of times per year), which would
be more informative than simply yes/no, or it can be binned in ordered categories. For
example, the American National Elections Study asks, “How often to you attend religious
services, not counting weddings or funerals?” and records five sorts of response: more than
once per week, once per week, more than once per month, several times per year, and never.
Finally, the three options for opinion about marijuana legislation could be coded as 1, 0, and
0.5, and further intermediate preferences could be identified with detailed survey questions,
for example asking about medical marijuana, criminal penalties, and so forth.
The point of bringing all this up in class is not to lay down the law and say that church
attendance, for example, is inherently discrete or continuous. Rather, we want to lead
students to think about the ways in which reality is abstracted by numerical measurements.
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Figure 2: Handedness can be measured by a 10-item questionnaire to yield an essentially
continuous score ranging from −1 (pure left-hander) to +1 (pure right-hander). We had the
students in an introductory statistics class fill out the questionnaire and also asked them
to sketch what they thought the histogram of other students’ handedness scores would look
like. (a) Data from the class; (b) a guess from a group of students of what they thought
the histogram would look like (before seeing the actual data). Bimodality was anticipated
but did not actually occur.
either by collecting our own data (as illustrated in Figure 2) or with library research (as by
looking at the National Elections Study questions).
The graph that wasn’t there
About fifteen years ago, when preparing to teach an introductory statistics class, I recalled
an enthusiastic review I had read (Sills, 1986) of the sixth edition of Hans Zeisel’s book,
Say it With Figures (1985). I bought the book and, flipping through it to find examples
for use in class, came across the two sketches reproduced in Figure 3 here. The curves
represent data from hospital admissions of premenopausal women who had been involved
in traffic accidents, with the left hump representing accidents that had occurred just before
the menstrual period and the right hump showing accidents occurring just after the period.
This seemed like a great example for class. I figured that a graph of the actual data
would be even better than a sketch, so I went to the library and found the cited research by
Katharina Dalton (1960). The graphs are reproduced in Figure 4, and they look nothing
like Zeisel’s sketches in Figure 3! For one thing, the sketched densities show almost all the
probability mass just before and after menstruation, but the data show only about half the
accidents occurring in these periods. Perhaps more seriously, the sketch shows two modes
with a gap in the middle, whereas the data show no evidence for such a gap. Similarly, the
two bell-shaped pictures in the second sketch of Figure 3 do not match the actual data as
shown in the histograms on the right side of Figure 4.
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Figure 3: Sketch from an example in Zeisel (1985), who writes, “When the frequency of
[driving] accidents is plotted against the time of menstruation a surprisingly shaped curve
arises [left graph]. Upon investigation, the curve turned out to be the composite of two
easily identified separate curves; one for parous women (those who had given birth) and
one for nonparous women). The one group had the accident peak immediately after their
period, the other immediately before it.” Compare to the actual data shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Graphs from Dalton (1960) with the raw data on menstruation and accidents.
These histograms look almost nothing like the sketches in Figure 3 taken from Zeisel’s book.
Many of the accidents fall outside of the days indicated by the modes in Figure 3 and, unlike
in those sketches, there is no gap just between the peaks.
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Dalton’s findings were conveniently summarized by an article in Time magazine on
November 28, 1960: “In four London general hospitals. Dr. Dalton questioned 84 female
accident victims (age range: 15 to 55), all of whom had normal, 28-day menstrual cycles.
Her findings: 52% of the accidents occurred to women who were within four days, either
way, of the beginning of menstruation. On a purely random basis, the rate would have
been only 28.5% for the same eight days. Childless women, noted Dr. Dalton, appear to be
abnormally accident-prone just before menstruation, while women who have borne children
are vulnerable over the whole premenstrual and menstrual period.” What is relevant to our
discussion here is that these findings were not accurately described in Zeisel’s book. On an
unrelated but amusing (from a current perspective) note, the Time article quoted Dalton as
saying that these findings “cause one to consider the wisdom of administering tranquilizers
for premenstrual tension.”
I suspect that Zeisel heard about the research (perhaps even by reading Time magazine),
recognized that it would be a good teaching example, and went to the library to read
Dalton’s original article. He then could have too hastily summarized the data in a sketch,
inadvertently knocking out most of the accidents that did not occur just before or after
menstruation and mistakenly inserting a gap in his histogram between the two modes. Or
perhaps he was loooking for an example of a mixture model and didn’t look too closely at
the data. In any case, this is a benefit to our students, who get a lesson in how easy it is
to misread a research report. Had Zeisel’s book not been so appealing and well written, we
would not have been drawn to the example in the first place.
Finding patterns in noise
The book Probability, Statistics, and Truth by Richard von Mises (1957) is an important
text in the foundations of probability, laying out a derivation of the axioms of probability
theory from the concept of infinite random sequences. This work has long been influential
in statistics (see, for example, Wald, 1939, and Good, 1958, for classical frequentist and
Bayesian reactions) and in philosophy (for example, Gillies, 2000, connects von Mises’s
ideas to those of Karl Popper and others).
I bought the book several years ago and, in skimming it, alighted on the chapter on
“Applications in Statistics,” within which von Mises uses the sex ratio of births to illustrate
the binomial distribution. He examines the proportion of babies born who were boys in
each of the 24 months of 1907–1908 in Vienna and found less variation than expected.
In his words: “The average of these 24 values is 0.514 33; the dispersion [variance] . . . is
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0.000 0533.” He computes the expected variance of p(1−p)/n = 0.000 0613 (here, n is about
3900 per month) and then writes, “The actual dispersion is smaller than the theoretical one.
In other investigations of the proportion of male births, a value of Lexis’s ratio closer to 1
is obtained. We must therefore look for an explanation of the slightly subnormal dispersion
found in this special case.” He goes on to attribute this lower variance to different sex ratios
in different racial or socioeconomic groups.
In fact, though, the variance, though less than expected by chance, is not at all statisti-
cally significantly less, based on the 23 degrees of freedom available from these data. (Under
the χ2
23
/23 distribution, the observed ratio of 0.869 has a p-value of 0.36; that is, one would
observe a ratio at least this extreme more than a third of the time, just by chance.) Thus,
it is unnecessary to search for an explanation for the discrepancy, especially given that, as
von Mises notes, sex ratios are among the rare data that actually do generally follow the
binomial distribution. In addition, irrelevantly for the technical point but of interest when
teaching, von Mises makes a presentational lapse by summarizing dispersion with variances
rather than standard deviations, which are more interpretable on the original scale of the
data.
Von Mises is hardly alone in overinterpreting birth data: there is a long tradition of
looking for patterns in birth data, despite that there is no convincing evidence that boys
or girls run in families or that sex ratios vary much at all except under extraordinary
conditions. (See Freese and Powell, 2001, Das Gupta, 2005, and Gelman, 2007, for more
on the overinterpretation of statistical fluctuations in sex ratios.) Thus, in addition to
illustrating the important technical point of assessing statistical significance of a variance
ratio, this example opens the door to a more general discussion of how and why statistics
can be misread.
That this occurred in an influential book merely underscores that even a standard χ2
test for overdispersion cannot be taken for granted. In a similar vein, finding that the great
Francis Galton performed inaccurate calculations with the normal distribution (mistakenly
estimating that there were nine-foot-tall men in Britain; see Gelman, 2006, and Wainer,
2007) gives us a new respect for the pioneers who worked out the mathematical property
of that model.
Discussion
Individually, these examples are of little importance. After all, one does not go to a statistics
textbook to learn about handedness, menstruation, and sex ratios. It is striking, however,
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that the very first examples I looked at in the Zeisel and von Mises books—the examples
with interesting data patterns—collapsed upon further inspection. In the Zeisel example,
we went to the secondary source and found that his sketch was not actually a graph of any
data, and that he in fact misinterpreted the results of the study. In the von Mises example,
we reanalyzed the data and found his result to be not statistically significant, thus casting
doubt on his already doubtful story about ethnic differences in sex ratios. In the Utts
and Heckard example, we were inspired to collect data on handedness and look at survey
questions on religious attendance to find underlying continuous structures.
Teaching activities already exist in which students apply critical reading skills to news
reports and scientific articles with statistical content (Gelman and Nolan, 2002); here the
recommendation is to have an inquiring eye when reading books that we teach from as well.
Much can be learned by redoing analyses and going to the primary and secondary sources
to look at data more carefully, and that this can help us teach even from our favorite books.
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